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Classified by: [redacted] Date: 10/25/80

NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES

[redacted] The United States could encourage the establishment of nuclear-free zones where it is the consensus of the countries in a particular geographic region that such a zone should be established.

Countries in such zones would be subject to the following obligations:

- a. Not to manufacture nuclear weapons or vehicles primarily designed for delivering such weapons, not to seek or to receive assistance from any other state in the manufacture of such weapons and vehicles, and not to acquire such weapons and vehicles in any other manner;
- b. Not to permit the storage, stationing [or testing] of nuclear weapons or vehicles primarily designed for delivering such weapons in the territory under their jurisdiction and control; and

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Such countries would be further obligated to accomplish the disposal or withdrawal of such weapons and vehicles as may presently be in the territory under their jurisdiction and control.

States possessing nuclear weapons and vehicles primarily designed for delivering them would undertake to cooperate with and respect such arrangements.

In presenting or adopting this position the United States should point out that its present feasibility varies among the different regions of the world:

1. Latin America -- A nuclear-free zone in Latin America would appear feasible and desirable at the present time. A Latin American nuclear-free zone should include all of the Western Hemisphere south of the U. S. border with the possible exception of territory under the jurisdiction and control of the United States.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ In supporting such an arrangement, the U. S. would have to be prepared to meet a Cuban argument that the missile and strategic aircraft on its territory are required to deter a possible U. S. invasion. The Cubans might suggest that an arrangement for a nuclear-free zone should

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include a guarantee of the territorial integrity of Cuba.

2. Africa - Similarly, it should be possible and would be desirable to achieve a nuclear-free zone in Africa. The United States should support such a zone, not only on its own merits, but also as a means of capitalizing on the interest which the African countries have already expressed in such a measure and focusing this interest on the problem of Latin America. In supporting an African nuclear free zone, the U.S. would have to consider the following problems:

3. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From the standpoint of the French, a problem might arise in stating out further nuclear tests, although the French have committed themselves to stopping such tests in that area at some time in the future.

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3. U.S. View of Arab-Israeli

...that the U.S. should
probably be considered as part
of a Middle Eastern zone rather
than as part of an African zone.

3. Middle East - In defining a possible Middle East
nuclear-free zone, the U.S. should consider that
such a zone would include the MEE and extend through
Afghanistan, but would not include Pakistan.

The following aspects need to be considered:

- a. Insofar as Turkey is concerned, two
alternatives arise:

- (1) Since Turkey is a member of NATO,
Turkey might be considered part
of the European problem rather than
the Middle East zone.
- (2) An alternative approach would be to
include Turkey as a Middle East
nuclear-free zone. The question of
how to deal with Turkey would have to
be considered in the light of other
factors bearing on the possible need
to withdraw offensive nuclear weapons
from Turkey in order to achieve a

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settlement of the Cuban situation. Inclusion of Turkey in a Middle East nuclear-free zone might be one way of introducing a new element of negotiability in aiming at a Cuban settlement while at the same time reducing the risk of accidental war in that area. Although such a zone would not seriously affect the European Western Deterrent, it would clearly present political difficulties and would necessitate substantial steps reaffirming the United States commitment to the defense of Turkey and to NATO as a whole.

5. Although Iran is a member of CENTO and would be affected by a zone in the Middle East, the fact that Iran has already committed itself not to receive missile bases on its territory appears to allay possible repercussions for CENTO.

6. In view of the recent acquisition of rockets by Israel and the HAZ, such a zone would have a real effect in stabilizing this area, if agreement could be obtained.

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more would have to be done to encourage the
Pakistan, India, China, Burma, Korea, and
Philippines, and other nations to join.

It is the Communist's conviction that the
work could be carried on under conditions in the
U. S., the establishment of the work under
adverse conditions.

In this connection there are of course the risk of cheating by the participants with the periodic problem. From the U. S. point of view the possibility that China might secretly continue with a nuclear program would be a major complication. However, it seems unlikely that Communist China could develop a weapons program without the U. S. and other countries in the West without detection by U. S. unilateral intelligence. If such cheating were to occur the U. S. would probably participate in a substantially earlier than the Chinese could expect an effective capability.

The factor which would have to be considered in defining an Antarctica is now turning to the question of whether Australia and New Zealand would be included. In defining the Eastern boundary of

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the zone, a possible boundary line, within the zone, all of the Pacific (with the possible exception of Australia and New Zealand) south of the equator and that portion of the Northern Pacific west of the international date line.

From the standpoint of the U. S., the creation of such a zone would mean, in effect, the withdrawal of U. S. weapons and vehicles from territory under the jurisdiction and control of countries in the zone and, in order to reach agreement, from territory under U. S. jurisdiction and control in the zone as well.

A question would arise with respect to the ability of the U. S. to place in the zone ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. Although such ships and aircraft could not be based in the zone, they could, as a practical matter, be permitted to operate there. Accordingly, the U. S. would be offering a "no ships out" commitment with respect to nuclear weapons located aboard U. S. ships and aircraft in the zone.

2. Europe - A U. S. approach along the foregoing lines would undoubtedly raise at the same time the question

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and the countries of Europe also have taken an arrangement establishing a nuclear-free zone. The U. S. would have to point out that the situation in Europe is obviously more complex than that in other regions where such zones might be considered and that the U. S. believed that the basic problem in Europe is that of resolving existing instabilities through appropriate reductions of armaments and through related arms control arrangements. The U. S. is prepared to go into much more in great detail but does not believe the establishment of nuclear-free zones in other areas can, at least, await resolution of problems which exist between the NATO and Warsaw Pacts.

Implementation of Nuclear-Free Zones

With respect to implementation of arrangements along the foregoing lines, the United States might take the following approach:

Special arrangements would, as a general matter, be negotiated by the governments of states in a particular geographic region. Obviously, special steps would have to be taken in Latin America in order to secure establishment of a nuclear-free zone there.

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The countries participating in particular regional arrangements could report to an appropriate organ of the UN on progress in implementing such arrangements.

- c. Insofar as verification is concerned, primary reliance would presumably be placed on unilateral intelligence sources. Insofar as other verification arrangements might be required, such arrangements might involve either calling on the UN to provide observers or taking such other steps as might be better suited to the needs of the particular region in question.

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NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES

[deleted] the United States could encourage the establishment of nuclear-free zones where it is the consensus of the countries in a particular geographic region that such a zone should be established.

Countries in such zones would be subject to the following obligations:

- a. Not to manufacture nuclear weapons or vehicles primarily designed for delivering such weapons, nor to seek or to receive assistance from any other state in the manufacture of such weapons and vehicles, and not to acquire such weapons and vehicles in any manner;
- b. Not permit the storage, stationing (or testing) of nuclear weapons or vehicles primarily designed for delivering such weapons in the territory under their jurisdiction and control; and
- c. [4 lines deleted]

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Such countries would be further obligated to accomplish the disposal or withdrawal of such weapons and vehicles as they presently be in the territory under their jurisdiction and control.

States possessing nuclear weapons and vehicles primarily designed for delivering them would undertake to cooperate with and respect such arrangements.

In presenting or adopting this position the United States should point out that its present feasibility varies among the different regions of the world:

1. Latin America - A nuclear-free zone in Latin America would appear feasible and desirable at the present time. A Latin American nuclear-free zone should include all of the Western Hemisphere south of the U.S. border with the possible exception of territory within the jurisdiction and control of the United States. (lines deleted) In supporting such an arrangement, the U.S. would have to be prepared to meet a Cuban demand that the missile and strategic aircraft operating in the territory are required to deter a possible Cuban invasion. The Cubans might suggest that an arrangement for a nuclear-free zone should

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include a guarantee of the territorial integrity of Cuba.

3. Africa - Similarly, it should be possible and would be desirable to achieve a nuclear-free zone in Africa. The United States should support such a zone, not only on its own merits, but also as a means of strengthening the interest which the African countries have already expressed in such a measure and showing the interest on the problem of Latin America. In supporting an African nuclear-free zone, the United States have to consider the following problems:

- a. [11 is deleted]
- b. [From the standpoint of the French, a problem might arise in phasing out further nuclear tests, although the French have committed themselves to stopping such tests in that area at some time in the future]

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- c. In view of Arab-Israeli relations, the Sinai Peninsula should probably be considered as part of the Middle East zone rather than part of an Arab zone.
- d. Yugoslavia - In defining a possible Middle East nuclear-free zone, the U.S. should consider that such a zone would include the UAR and extend through Afghanistan, but would not include Pakistan.

The following aspects need to be considered:

- a. Insofar as Turkey is concerned, the alternatives arise:

- (1) Since Turkey is a member of NATO, it should not be considered part of the European zone, but rather the Middle East zone.
- (2) An alternative approach would be to consider Turkey in a Middle East nuclear-free zone. The question of how to deal with Turkey would then have to be considered in the light of other factors bearing on the possible need to withdraw nuclear weapons from Turkey in order to achieve a

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settlerent of the Cuban situation. Israel's role in Turkey in a Middle East nuclear-free zone might be one way of introducing a new element of negotiability in aiming at a Cuban settlement while at the same time reducing the risk of accidental war in that area. Although such a zone would not seriously effect the over-all Western interrent, it would clearly prevent political difficulties and would necessitate substantial steps reaffirming the United States commitment to the defense of Turkey and to NATO as a whole.

Although Iran is a member of CENTO and would be affected by a zone in the Middle East, the fact that Iran has already committed itself not to receive missile bases on its territory appears to eliminate possible repercussions for CENTO. In view of the recent acquisition of rock by Israel and the USSR, such a zone would have a real effect in stabilizing this area, if agreement could be obtained.

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Asia and the Western Pacific - An Asian-Pacific zone would have to include Communist China, Siberia, India, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, the Philippines, and other Asian countries.

If Chinese Communist participation in such a zone could be obtained on terms acceptable to the U.S., the establishment of the zone would be advantageous.

In this zone more than any of the others, the risk of cheating by the participants would be a real problem, from the U.S. point of view and realizing that China might secretly continue with a missile program would be a major consideration. However, it seems unlikely that Communist China could develop a capability threatening to the U.S. and other countries in the area without detection by U.S. unilateral intelligence. If such cheating were detected, the U.S. would probably nuclearize the area considerably before the Chinese could develop an effective capability.

The factor which would have to be considered in defining an Asian-Pacific zone relative to the question of whether Australia and New Zealand would be included in defining the Eastern boundary of

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the zone, a possible boundary might include, within the zone, all of the Pacific (with the possible exception of Australia and New Zealand, south of the equator) and that portion of the Northern Pacific west of the International date line.

From the standpoint of the U.S., the creation of such a zone would mean, in effect, the withdrawal of U.S. weapons and vehicles from territory under the jurisdiction and control of countries in the zone and, in order to reach agreement, from territory under U.S. jurisdiction and control of the zone as well.

A question would arise with respect to the ability of the U.S. to place in the area ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. Although such ships and aircraft could not be based in the zone, it does not, as a practical matter, seem possible to exclude them. Accordingly, the U.S. might consider offering a "no first use" commitment with respect to nuclear weapons carried aboard U.S. ships and aircraft in the zone.

4. Europe - A U.S. approach along the foregoing lines would undoubtedly raise at the same time the question of

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that the countries of Europe also enter into an arrangement establishing a nuclear-free zone. The U.S. would have to point out that the situation in Europe is obviously more complex than that in other regions where such zones might be considered and that the U.S. believed existing instabilities through appropriate reduction of armaments and through related arms control arrangements. The U.S. is prepared to go into such matters in great detail but does not believe the establishment of nuclear-free zones in other areas will or need await resolution of problems which exist between the NATO and Warsaw Pacts.

Implementation of Nuclear-Free Zones

With respect to implementation of arrangements along the foregoing lines, the United States might take the following approach:

- a. Zonal arrangements would, as a general pattern, be negotiated by the governments of states in particular geographic region. Obviously, special steps would have to be taken in Latin America in order to secure establishment of a nuclear-free zone there.

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b. The countries participating in a particular regional arrangement would report to an appropriate organ of the UN on progress in implementing zonal arrangements.

c. Insofar as verification is concerned, primary reliance would presumably be placed on unilateral intelligence sources. Insofar as other verification arrangements might be required, such arrangements might involve either calling on the UN to provide observers or taking such other steps as might be better suited to the needs of the particular region in question.

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